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| Wyoming Supreme Court Cases |
REBECCA J. LUHM V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF HOT SPRINGS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
2009 WY 63
206 P.3d 1290
Case Number: S-07-0227
Decided: 05/12/2009
APRIL
TERM, A.D. 2009
REBECCA
J. LUHM,
Appellant
(Plaintiff),
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
HOT SPRINGS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.
1,
Appellee
(Defendant).
Appeal
from the District Court of Hot Springs County
The
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge
Representing
Appellant:
Patrick
E. Hacker, Gregory P. Hacker, Erin M. Kendall of Patrick E. Hacker, P.C.,
Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by
Patrick E. Hacker.
Representing
Appellee:
Tracy
J. Copenhaver of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell,
Wyoming. Argument by Mr.
Copenhaver.
Before
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.
GOLDEN,
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, J., files a dissenting opinion, in
which KITE, J., joins.
GOLDEN,
Justice.
[¶1] Rebecca J. Luhm
worked for the Board of Trustees of Hot Springs County School District No. 1
(the School District) as a guidance counselor. In 2006, Luhm filed a complaint alleging
the School District terminated her from her job with the School District in a
manner that violated law. Luhm
contended she was a “teacher” as defined by the Wyoming Teacher Employment Law
(WTEL), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-1-101 through 114 (LexisNexis 2007), and thus was
entitled to its protections. Luhm
claimed that her termination was contrary to the spirit and the letter of the
WTEL. She sought declaratory
relief, asking that the district court declare her to be a continuing contract
teacher under state law. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the School District and denied Luhm’s motion for summary
judgment. We
affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] Luhm raises these
issues:
1.
Was Rebecca Luhm a “teacher” as defined in W.S. §
21-7-102(a)(vii)?
2.
May a school district defeat the statutory protections of the Wyoming
Teacher Employment Law by requiring forms of contract that are inconsistent with
the statutes?
3.
May a court judicially amend the Wyoming Teacher Employment Law to narrow
the scope of persons protected, in contravention of the
statutes?
4.
Were there material issues of fact precluding summary
judgment?
5.
Did the [school] district’s refusal to treat Rebecca Luhm as a continuing
contract teacher deny her statutory and due process
rights?
The
School District presents this view of the issues:
1.
Was Rebecca Luhm, who was at all times employed as a social worker and
guidance counselor, required to be given continuing contract teacher
status?
2.
Was the [school] district required to give Rebecca Luhm a hearing when
her contract was terminated as a result of a financial need to reduce the number
of staff employed by Hot Springs County School District No.
1?
3.
Are there other reasons in the record for affirming the district court’s
summary judgment in favor of [the school district]?
FACTS
[¶3] Luhm began
working for the School District in 1990.
On November 20, 1990, she entered into the following contract with the
School District:
OFFICE
OF THE SUPERINTENDENT
HOT
SPRINGS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1
THERMOPOLIS,
WYOMING
Non-Teaching
Contract
THIS AGREEMENT, entered into this 20th day of November, 1990,
between the Board of Trustees of Hot Springs County School District No. 1 in the
County of Hot Springs and State of Wyoming, and Rebecca Luhm a qualified
certified employee of said County.
WITNESSETH: That the said
Rebecca Luhm agrees to accept and fulfill the position of Social Worker in the
Hot Springs County School District No. 1 in a faithful and efficient manner for
the term of 125 days commencing on the 19th day of November, 1990,
and agrees further that the Superintendent or Board of Trustees may assign
extra-curricular activities and/or other subjects than that herein named; and
agrees to keep herself qualified, and agrees in all things to observe the rules
and regulations of the Board of Trustees of Hot Springs County School District
No. 1.
IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, said Board of Trustees, Hot Springs County
School District No. 1, agrees to pay said employee the sum of eighteen thousand
one hundred thirty four and 32/100 dollars ($18,134.32). Payment shall be made for said services
in nine equal installments, the first payment of $2,014.88 to be made on
December 15th, and the remaining payments of $2,014.93 to be made on
the 15th day of each succeeding calendar month
except that June, July, and August salary will be paid in full the last working
day of this school year.
PROVIDED, that in case said Rebecca Luhm shall be discharged for
sufficient cause by the Board of Trustees, Hot Springs County School District
No. 1, or shall have her certificate annulled, she shall not be entitled to any
compensation from and after such dismissal or annulment, but shall receive her
proportionate share of the June, July, and August salary based on the number of
days actually worked.
ALL REQUIREMENTS for certification in the State of Wyoming are the sole
responsibility of the applicant.
According to State Law, a certified employee cannot be paid unless proper
certification has been obtained.
THE EMPLOYEE may for any reason elect not to extend the contract or enter
into a new contract for any term beyond that set forth above, and likewise the
school district may elect for any reason not to extend the contract or renew the
contract for any term. This is a
non-teaching contract and will not provide continuing contract status to the
employee named herein.
THIS EMPLOYEE’S CONTRACT embodies the entire agreement and contract
between the undersigned parties, and each agrees that there are no
representations, conditions, or agreements, oral or otherwise, not contained
herein or modifying the terms of this contract.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto subscribed our names this 20th day
of November, 1990.
[¶4] Luhm signed
contracts that were the same, or similar enough to be considered the same, over
the succeeding years through the year 2002. As can be ascertained from the above
contract, she was at first hired as a “social worker,” and that assignment was
expressed in later contracts as “M.S. social worker” and later yet as “guidance
counselor.”
[¶5] In a letter dated
February 11, 2003, the Superintendent of Schools informed
Luhm:
It is with regret that I inform you that you will not be provided a
contract for the 2003-04 school year.
Because expenditures have exceeded revenues, the Board is taking action
to reduce expenses. Unfortunately,
staffing positions have been cut.
The board members indicated that the staffing decisions were difficult to
make, and it was with regret that this action had to be
taken.
If there is any way that the central office staff may be of assistance to
you as you prepare to leave the district in the spring, please feel free to call
upon us. We wish you well in the
future.
[¶6] Luhm requested a
hearing, and the School District denied that request on the basis that she had
no contractual or statutory right to a hearing. Luhm then filed the instant action in
district court. Luhm’s claims
included an assertion that the School District’s termination of her employment
was contrary to state law and school board policy. She claimed she was denied due process
of law because the school board refused to give her a hearing. She also sought relief under the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act in the form of a declaration that she was both a
“teacher” and “a continuing contract teacher” under Wyoming law. The district court granted the School
District’s motion for summary judgment and denied Luhm’s motion for summary
judgment.
DISCUSSION
General
Law
[¶7] In reviewing a
trial court’s entry of summary judgment, we examine the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party all reasonable inferences
that can fairly be drawn from the record.
Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact is a
disputed fact that, if proven, would establish or refute an essential element of
a cause of action or a defense raised by the parties. For a summary judgment motion to be
successful, the movant must make a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of
material fact exists. The burden
thereafter shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact.
Moreover, this Court evaluates the propriety of summary judgment using
the same standards and materials used by the district court, affording no
deference to the district court’s decision on issues of law. A grant of summary judgment may be
affirmed on any proper legal grounds supported by the record. Wells v. Bd. of Trustees of Laramie Cty.
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 3 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2000).
Issue
1: Was Luhm a “teacher” as defined by the WTEL?
[¶8] Since Luhm is
unambiguously not a teacher by contract, the question becomes whether she is a
teacher by statute. We construe
statutory language as follows:
In
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the
legislature’s intent. All statutes
must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given
law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Statutory construction is a question of
law, so our standard of review is de novo.
We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with [the] legislature’s
intent. We begin by making an
inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed
according to their arrangement and connection. We construe the statute as a whole,
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of
the statute in pari materia. When a
statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory
construction. We must not give a
statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of
another interpretation. Moreover,
we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not
fall within its express provisions.
Jenkins
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div.,
2007 WY 39, ¶ 6, 153 P.3d 271, 273 (Wyo. 2007).
[¶9] A “teacher” is
defined by the WTEL as “[a]ny person employed under contract by the board of
trustees of a school district as a certified professional employee.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-7-102(vii)
(LexisNexis 2007). Luhm’s argument
is simple. Luhm is certificated by
the Professional Teaching Standards Board (PTSB). She argues she therefore qualifies as a
“certified professional employee,” making her a de jure teacher. We find the construction of the
definition of “teacher” under the WTEL slightly more
complex.
[¶10] The language of the WTEL must be read in pari materia not only with its own
provisions but also with the provisions of the Wyoming Education Code of 1969
(Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-1-101 through 21-13-721 (LexisNexis 2007)). State ex rel. Wyoming Dept. of Revenue v.
Hanover Compression, LP, 2008 WY 138, ¶ 8, 196 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2008)
(this Court considers and construes all statutes relating to the same subject or
having the same general purpose in harmony); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Campbell Cty. v. Rio
Tinto Energy America, Inc., 2008 WY 139, ¶ 5, 196 P.3d 791, 793 (Wyo. 2008).
When so read, we believe it
apparent that the WTEL requires all teachers to be certified professional
employees but does not envisage that all certified professional employees be
considered teachers. To construe
the WTEL definition of “teacher” otherwise would run counter to numerous
provisions of the Education Code.
[¶11] When reviewing the Education Code as a
whole we find several provisions recognizing a distinction between teachers and
other certified professional employees.
For instance, school boards are entrusted with the power to hire a school
superintendent, principals, teachers, other certified professional employees,
and other personnel. Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 21-3-111(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2007).1 The PTSB promulgates rules and
regulations “[f]or the certification of school administrators, teachers and
other personnel.” Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 21-2-802(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) (emphasis added). In reporting salaries a school district
board of trustees must individually categorize salaries:
Each individual annual gross salary shall be identified by category and
each individual salary shall be published as a gross dollar amount without
identification other than by category.
Categories shall include superintendent, assistant superintendent, high
school principal, assistant high school principal, junior high principal, junior
high assistant principals, elementary principals, elementary assistant
principals, first grade teachers, second grade teachers, third grade teachers,
fourth grade teachers, fifth grade teachers, sixth grade teachers, kindergarten
teachers, high school departmental teachers (business, language arts, foreign
languages, science, social studies, mathematics, or other), vocal music,
instrumental music, elementary music, secondary art, elementary art, secondary
physical education, elementary physical education, vocational education,
secondary guidance counselors, secondary librarians, elementary librarians,
driver education, special education teachers, remedial teachers, nurses,
teacher's aides, head coaches, assistant coaches, dramatics, secondary
secretarial, junior high secretarial, elementary secretarial, business managers,
janitorial, bus drivers, and other categories which may be selected so that
every individual salary may be categorized.
Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 21-3-110(a)(ii)(A) (LexisNexis 2007). All these provisions make clear that
there are more certified professional employees of a school district than just
teachers. Indeed, this is made even
more apparent when one considers the composition of the PTSB. The PTSB is comprised of, among
others:
Six (6) certified public school employee members, two (2) of which shall
be classroom teachers in grades kindergarten through six (6), three (3) of which
shall be classroom teachers in grades seven (7) through twelve (12) and one
(1) of which shall be a certified professional employee not assigned to
classroom teaching but providing auxiliary professional services such as
librarian, guidance counselor or educational diagnostician[.]
Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 21-2-801(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) (emphasis added). This provision expressly considers a
guidance counselor a certified professional employee, but not a teacher.
[¶12] So what exactly does the WTEL mean
when it defines “teacher” as “any person employed under contract by the board of
trustees of a school district as a certified professional employee.” To focus solely on the second part of
the definition would nullify the distinctions between teachers and other
certified professional employees contained in the above mentioned statutes. Instead, it must not be forgotten that
the definition is for the term “teacher,” which imposes some inherent
limitations.
[¶13] In Seyfang v. Board of Trustees of Washakie
County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 563 P.2d 1376 (Wyo. 1977), the Court considered the
reach of the WTEL definition of “teacher.”
Seyfang, a school superintendent, sought to be considered a “teacher” as
defined by the WTEL. As required,
he was certificated for the position of superintendent. Similar to Luhm’s instant argument,
Seyfang argued that, since he was a certified professional employee he fit the
definition of a “teacher.” The Seyfang Court disagreed. After conducting a statutory analysis
similar to what we have just done, the Seyfang Court determined that the term
“teacher” as used in the WTEL was limited to certified professional employees
who were actually engaged in the teaching profession. Since the function of supervising is
demonstrably different than the function of teaching, the Seyfang court determined Seyfang was not
a teacher as contemplated by the WTEL.
[¶14] The holding’s logic applies equally
here. The term “teacher” under the
WTEL envisages certified professional employees engaged in the teaching
profession. The question then
becomes whether Luhm was actively involved in teaching as commonly
understood. Looking first to her
PTSB certificate, it carries the endorsements “Counselor K-12” and “School
Social Worker K-12.” In contrast,
other PTSB certificates hold endorsements such as “English,” “World History,”
“United States History,” and “Art K-12.”
The obvious difference is guidance counseling and social work are not
subjects taught to students.
[¶15] Luhm argues that, factually, her job
responsibilities were those of a teacher.
Since this was summary judgment, we give Luhm the benefit of all
reasonable inferences. Besides
advising students on personal matters, Luhm claims she taught social skills and
study skills to groups, sometimes in a classroom setting. Luhm further claims she was paid on the
teacher salary schedule and was referred to as a teacher on many evaluation
forms and professional development plans.
She also performed other duties required of teachers, including bus duty
and lunch duty, and working at school sporting events. The problem is nothing mentioned by Luhm
involves teaching students a specific recognized academic subject. Consequently, there is no question of
material fact. Luhm’s actual
day-to-day activities do not fit within the definition of a “teacher” as
contemplated by the WTEL.
CONCLUSION
[¶16] We certainly do not wish to make light
of the importance of advising students on personal, social, academic and
vocational matters, but such functions do not fit within the commonly understood
meaning of teaching. Rather, we
agree that a guidance counselor is not a teacher but rather a certified
professional employee who provides auxiliary professional services. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-801(a)(i)
(quoted supra). Luhm, certificated
as a guidance counselor and social worker, is not a teacher within the meaning
of the WTEL and is therefore not entitled to its protections. As such, all other issues advanced by
Luhm are moot.
Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-111(a) states in pertinent
part:
(a) The board of trustees in
each school district within the state may:
* * * *
(vi) Employ and determine the salaries and duties
of:
(A) A superintendent of schools who shall be the chief administrative
officer of the district;
(B) Principals who shall assume the administrative responsibility and
instructional leadership of any schools to which they are assigned in accordance
with policies adopted by the board of trustees, provided that in the event a
superintendent of schools shall request recommendations from a principal
concerning the suspension, dismissal, assignment, transfer or termination of any
teacher employed in the school to which the principal is assigned, such
recommendation shall be given only after periodic evaluation of the teacher’s
classroom performance;
(C) Teachers who shall provide the expertise in their areas of
instruction;
(D) Other certified professional employees; and
(E) Other personnel[.]
HILL,
Justice,
dissenting, with whom KITE, Justice,
joins.
[¶17] I respectfully dissent because I do
not agree with the majority that the district court was correct in determining
that there were no genuine issues of material fact at large in this case. Furthermore, I do not agree that Mrs.
Luhm was not a “teacher,” as that word is used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §
21-7-102(a)(vii), as a matter of law.
[¶18] The majority concludes that Luhm is
“unambiguously not a teacher by contract.”
I do not believe that issue can be dismissed quite so lightly. The contract she was offered described
the position as a “Non-Teaching Contract.”
However, the evidence she offered in support of her resistance to the
School District’s motion for summary judgment could fairly be read by a
reasonable “fact finder” to have been a “conclusion about,” and not a
“description of,” the work actually contemplated by the contract and actually
assigned to her under that contract (and which, in effect, exacted a waiver from
Luhm of the protections of the WTEL, in exchange for the contract, a strategy
which is generally rejected by applicable case law).
[¶19] Luhm was certified by the Wyoming
Professional Teaching Standards Board.
I do not disagree that statutes relating to the same subject are
generally read in pari materia, but
in my view the most that can be said about § 21-2-801 is that it recognizes
“classroom teachers” as a subset of “teachers,” and that circumstance does not
serve to advance an argument that only “classroom teachers” are “teachers.” Likewise, I simply cannot accept the
leap in logic that “classroom teaching” includes only “traditional academic”
subjects. I can find nothing in the
statutes that justifies the boundaries of “teacher” as set by the majority
opinion. The recitation of Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 21-3-110(a)(ii)(A) (duties of boards of trustees), used by the
majority to delimit the statutory definition of “teacher” is, at best, a
debasing of the in pari materia
rule.
[¶20] The majority also treats this
statutory provision as specifically denying “guidance counselors” the status of
teacher:
(a) The
Wyoming professional teaching standards board is created to consist of thirteen
(13) members appointed by the state superintendent as
follows:
(i) Six
(6) certified public school employee members, two (2) of which shall be
classroom teachers in grades kindergarten through six (6), three (3) of which
shall be classroom teachers in grades seven (7) through twelve (12) and one (1) of which shall be a certified
professional employee not assigned to classroom teaching but providing
auxiliary professional services such as librarian, guidance counselor or
educational diagnostician; [Emphasis added.]
Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 21-2-801(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).
[¶21] In my view, the most that provision
does is to disqualify Luhm from being on the board because she was an auxiliary
professional service provider who was
assigned to classroom teaching.
Furthermore, it announces the very real possibility that certified
professional employees may be (and in fact are in some districts) assigned to
serve as a “teacher” in a “classroom” setting and/or a “non-classroom”
setting.
[¶22] Finally, the majority hangs its hat
on a conclusion that Luhm did not teach a “specific recognized academic
subject.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. §
21-9-101 (LexisNexis 2007) (Courses of Study) provides:
(b) Each
school district within the state shall provide educational programs sufficient
to meet uniform student content and performance standards at the level
established by the state board of education in the following areas of knowledge
and skills:
(i) Common core of knowledge:
(A) Reading/language arts;
(B) Social studies;
(C) Mathematics;
(D) Science;
(E) Fine arts and performing arts;
(F) Physical education;
(G) Health and safety;
(H) Humanities;
(J) Career/vocational education;
(K) Foreign cultures and languages;
(M) Applied technology;
(N) Government and civics including state and federal
constitutions pursuant to W.S. 21-9-102.
(ii) For
grades one (1) through eight (8), reading, writing and mathematics shall be
emphasized under the common core of knowledge specified under paragraph (b)(i)
of this section;
(iii) Common core of skills:
(A) Problem solving;
(B) Interpersonal communications;
(C) Keyboarding
and computer applications;
(D) Critical thinking;
(E) Creativity;
(F) Life skills, including personal financial management
skills.
[¶23] An examination of an accepted
definition of “academic” readily demonstrates that that word does not, and
should not, play a role in further describing the meaning of “teacher” as set
out in the governing statute. Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, “academic” 9 (1986); and see, 1 Roget’s International Thesaurus, § 563
“TEACHER” (1970).
[¶24] For the reasons summarized above, I would reverse the district court’s summary judgment order and remand this matter to the district court for full development of a trial record.
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